dramatically in the postwar period (Baker et al., 1981; Conradt, 1980) and in which the mass media are said to have played a major role in attitude change and electoral behavior (Noelle-Neumann, 1978 , 1980 Norpoth and Baker, 1980) . Our goals are to analyze the content of the debates held during the 1972 campaign as well as the nature of the interaction among the participants, and to assess how watching the debates affected popular evaluations of the participants, the parties, and the issues. Our analysis of debate effects will be based on a panel survey, 1 which puts us in the fortunate position of being able to examine attitude change across time. In order to provide the context in which the German debates took place, let us briefly review the setting of the 1972 election (Conradt and Lambert, 1974; Heidenheimer and Kommers, 1975: ch. 5; Kaltefleiter, 1973; and Kaase, 1973) .
The German Election of 1972 and the Televised Debates
The federal election of 1972 offered the West German electorate the rare opportunity to decide outright which party combination should run the federal government. Each of the four parties in the Bundestag had committed itself to a particular course of action following the election. The Social Democratic party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were pledged to a continuation of their coalition, whereas the alliance of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) aimed at unseating that government coalition. While Willy Brandt (SPD) would continue as chancellor in the event of an SPD-FDP victory at the polls, Rainer Barzel (CDU) had been designated as the joint chancellor-candidate by the CDU and CSU. The election had been called one year ahead of schedule to settle precisely the issue which the Bundestag had been unable to resolve, namely, whether or not Barzel instead of Brandt should head the federal government. Barzefs attempt earlier in 1972 at ousting Brandt in a vote of no-confidence had fallen just two votes short-amidst charges of vote buying-of the necessary 249-vote majority in the Bundestag. The parliamentary deadlock, which had come about through the defection of a handful of SPD-FDP deputies since 1969, neither allowed the SPD-FDP coalition to govern nor the CDU/CSU 1 The 1972 survey utilized in this analysis was made available by the Zentralarchiv in Cologne, West Germany, study no. 635/636/637; it can also be obtained from the ICPSR in Ann Arbor, Michigan, study no. 7102. The 1972 survey was conducted by Manfred Berger, Wolfgang Gibowski, Max Kasse, Dieter Roth, Uwe Schleth, and Rudolf Wildenmann. to take over the government. Thus, the voters were called upon to break the tie and install a new government enjoying majority support.
During perhaps the most frenzied and bitterly fought electoral campaign since 1949-with an eventual voting turnout of 91.2 percentthe West German electorate was treated to its first encounter with televised debates between the top political figures. A straight confrontation between the two candidates for the chancellorship, Brandt (SPD) and Barzel (CDU), which would have been most dramatic, was ruled out because of the parliamentary nature of the Federal Republic. Chancellors, after all, are not popularly elected. That choice is up to the members of the Bundestag. The match between Brandt and Barzel also would have excluded the leaders of the other two parties, the FDP and the CSU, neither of which regarded itself simply as an appendage of the SPD or the CDU, respectively. As a result, the two television networks in West Germany arranged for a format which provided for the presence of the chairmen of the four parties; parties not represented in the Bundestag were ignored. It so happened that the chairman of the SPD was Chancellor Brandt and the chairman of the CDU was Mr. Barzel. The chairman of the FDP, Walter Scheel, served as vice-chancellor and foreign minister in the cabinet, and the chairman of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, was certain to become a key member in a future CDU/CSU cabinet.
These four politicians-Brandt, Barzel, Scheel, and Straussparticipated in three television "debates" held on October 18, November 2, and November 15. The 1972 general election took place on November 19. The format of the debates varied. In the first two, each of which lasted about an hour, journalists played a significant role. They directed questions to the various party leaders, followed up with additional questions, and sometimes summarized what the participants had said either in their answers to the questions or in other campaign appearances. A good portion of the first two debates, therefore, involved interaction between the participants and the journalists rather than interaction between the participants themselves. In contrast, the third debate, which was held only four days before the election and lasted over two hours, was characterized almost exclusively by interaction among the four party leaders. The moderator's role was essentially to keep track of how long each participant had spoken.
Content-Analyzing the Debates
Our analysis of debate content is based on the written transcripts. It might have been more appropriate to examine the audiovisual appear-ances of the participants, but our access was restricted to the written record.
2 Our efforts at decoding this record were greatly aided by a coding scheme developed by Klingemann (1976) and successfully applied in content analyses of party platforms, campaign speeches, and newspaper editorials, as well as voter evaluations of parties in answers to open-ended questions by Schoenbach (Schoenbach, 1977; Schoenbach and Wildenmann, 1978) .
Each sentence spoken by a debate participant was evaluated in terms of the following questions: (a) Does it refer to one of the four political parties represented in the Bundestag or their leaders? (b) Does it attach a positive or negative evaluation to them? If so, the reference to party or leader was coded; otherwise, it was ignored. The Klingemann coding scheme provides for 52 distinct categories of political content grouped in seven broad classes: (1) Ideology, (2) Social groups, (3) Domestic policy, (4) Foreign policy, (5) Government and party management, (6) Personal attributes of politicians, and (7) Nonpolitical properties. (For a complete listing of the categories used in this analysis, see Schoenbach, 1978.) Any time a sentence contained a statement linking a party or leader with one of these 52 properties in a positive or negative fashion, it was coded as a separate "reference." A spoken sentence could contain several such references, or none at all.
Distribution of the Participants' Debate Contributions
It is one of the cardinal rules of debates, on television or elsewhere, that the participants are entitled to equal amounts of time. This was true for the German electoral debates, even though the parties represented by the four chairmen differed greatly in strength. The debate moderators meticulously monitored the time used by the participants and occasionally admonished them not to exceed their quota. As a result of these efforts, all four party leaders "got in" roughly the same number of sentences. We counted a total number of 1,696 sentences spoken during the three debates, ranging from brief interjections like "grotesque" to seemingly endless, complicated lectures. Even though it appears in Table 1 that Strauss was more verbose than, say, Scheel, the overall distribution of spoken sentences across the four speakers does not differ significantly from equality (x* = 4.87, df = 3, n.s.). A few more than half of the sentences spoken during the debates, 988 of 1,696, made references that we found codable. The remainder of the sentences either did not refer to the West German parties or their leaders, or failed to associate them in a positive or negative fashion. The four participants were remarkably similar in their ability to address relevant concerns in their debate contributions, and their shares of codable sentences out of sentences spoken did not differ significantly.
The 933 codable sentences yielded 1,387 references. While most codable sentences contained but one reference, others contained several, thereby raising the average to about 1.5 references for each coded sentence.
Unlike party platforms or speeches to the party faithful, debates provide not only a forum for the recitation of party dogmas, but also an opportunity for a head-on clash between the persons leading those parties. Sudden outbursts of indignation, emphatic denials, and sarcastic putdowns turn debates into bitter feuds with tempers flaring and the moderators trying to restore calm. In order to capture the personal flavor of the debates, we decided to code references to political leaders, primarily the debate participants themselves, separately from the references to political parties, and not simply as one of the ways of referring to parties. A total of 437 references, as Table 1 shows, or about one in three, concern political figures. The incumbent Chancellor Brandt captures the lion's share of personal references, with challenger Barzel far behind. Barzel, in fact, receives even less attention than the leader of the CDLTs "sister party," Strauss.
This kind of salience, however, may prove to be a mixed blessing. As Table 1 indicates, each participant owes a large share of his references to comments from the opposite side. This especially applies to Brandt, who has Barzel and Strauss to thank for his prominence.
The prominence of Brandt among personal references is amply duplicated in the prominence of the party coalition he leads among the partisan references. Approximately 66 percent of the references to parties concern the federal government, composed of the SPD and the FDP, whereas only a quarter of such references point to the opposition (CDU and the CSU). Clearly, the promises, performances, and prospects, as well as the personnel of the incumbent government provide the "food" for debate. These matters preoccupy Chancellor Brandt no less than they do the leader of the CSU, Strauss. While chancellor-candidate Barzel shows a better balance in his references to government and opposition, he, too, fails to accord his own side the higher share.
As a result, personal references reveal a pattern distinct from that of partisan references. In their references to political figures, the government leaders as well as the opposition leaders zero in on the persons on the opposite side. In their partisan references, on the other hand, both share a common concern with the government side.
The Evaluation of Parties and Leaders in the Debates
Heavy exposure during a debate may or may not benefit a governing coalition. This will depend on the properties attributed to the parties and leaders in the coalition and on the evaluations of these parties and leaders that are offered. We shall first focus on the question of evaluation. Let us designate as "positive" those references which either associate a positively valued property with a party or leader, or disassociate a negatively valued property from it. "Negative," in turn, would denote a reference which either disassociates a positive property from a party or leader, or associates a negative property with it.
Both the government coalition and the opposition, as Table 2 bears out, enjoy a positive balance of evaluations, as does each party in the coalition. But the paltry figure of 53 percent positive is not impressive for the government side, especially when contrasted to the two-thirds share of positive references captured by the opposition. The weak points of the coalition in power are about as heavily exposed as are the strong points. The same holds true for the SPD, the major party in the coalition. However, the FDP, the junior partner in the coalition, is largely spared disparaging remarks. This party appears to benefit from its pivotal location in the German party system; it is crucial to the success of both the SPD and the CDU/CSU in their quests for government power. While partisan references reveal a positive bias, however slight, for each party, their leaders, without exception, encounter far more negative than positive references. For all the attention focused on him in the debates, Chancellor Brandt, as Table 2 demonstrates, finds himself swamped by negative comments; only 16 percent of debate references to him are favorable. The other three leaders do not fare much better. Rather than engage the political leaders in a gentlemanly exchange of differing points of view, these televised debates pit the participants against one another in a bruising personal battle.
It is important to keep in mind that the debates convey impressions about the political leaders participating in them not only by what is said about them, but also by what they say themselves, and how they say it. How, for example, do the participants in their debate statements evaluate their colleagues, the other parties, and themselves? Table 3 presents figures on the balance between positive and negative references to parties for each of the four participants; the entries refer to the difference between percent positive and percent negative. Both Brandt and Scheel, as can be gleaned from Table 3 , offer decidedly positive assessments of the parties. Strauss and Barzel, on the other hand, emphasize the parties' negative features, although Barzel does so less blatantly.
All four participants, however, follow exactly the same script in evaluating their own side compared to the adversary side. Brandt 1 s and Scheers references to the SPD-FDP coalition are all but perfectly positive (percentage difference scores of +95 and +100); so are BarzeFs and Strauss's references to the CDU/CSU (+98 and +92). At the same time, references to the opposite side provide a negative mirror image of this picture, with percentage difference values close to -100. Scheers negative bias in his references to the SPD as a party may be discounted in light of the few references on which it is based. On the whole, the flavor of evaluations conveyed by the debaters is either purely sweet or purely sour-nothing but praise for one's own side, and nothing but damnation for the adversary side. Few, if any, conciliatory tones are heard. The debates highlight the parliamentary struggle between the government spokesmen (SPD and FDP) defending the record of their government and the opposition (CDU and CSU) spokesmen attacking that record. By deciding on a negative, attacking course, the opposition focused attention on the government and allowed the government to assume a positive or defending posture. There was nothing in the format of the debates or in the way the media handled them in 1972 to force the opposition to preoccupy itself with the government. Their spokesmen could as well have chosen to put forth proposals of their own. Had they chosen this strategy, a larger share of the debates would have been devoted to their side and their contributions would have carried a more positive flavor. As it was in 1972, the CDU/CSU hoped to reap the most benefits from taking on the government parties in the debates the same way it had been doing in the Bundestag since 1969, namely, head-on. The opposition was determined to shred the governing coalition's thin majority in the Bundestag and its policy record in front of the television audience.
A key target of the opposition's attacks, as Let us begin by noting what was not discussed in the debates. First, there is a noteworthy absence of references that could even remotely be classified as "conservative," "Christian," or "right." The debates reveal no sharp ideological cleavages dividing the parties. Unlike the kinds of debates often held in the legislatures of the Hohenzollern Empire and even the Weimar Republic, these televised confrontations were not forums for the participants to argue their respective ideological positions. Second, there are few references that link parties or leaders with particular social classes or groups. Hence, there is little evidence that the participants were eager to use the debates to court their respective constituencies.
What, then, was the central focus of the debates? Here the answer is relatively straightforward: issues and, secondarily, ethics (Table 4 ). The dominant concern of the 1972 debates was foreign policy, especially relations with East Germany. Indeed, nearly one in three debate references focused on relations between East and West Germany, particularly the recently concluded Grundvertrag (Basic Treaty) which established the groundwork for improved relations between the two Germanies. Since this treaty was immensely popular in West Germany, the debates provided a forum to exhibit a successful government policy and to test opposition challenges to it.
Approximately another third of the debate references link parties or leaders with the handling of specific domestic political issues. The principal concerns here were general economic policy and the rising level of inflation. The only other domestic issues that received any significant attention were terrorism and law and order, matters that became of increasing public concern after the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympic Games that occurred a few weeks before the debates.
Finally, a quarter of the debate references focused on government and party management. Although this category encompasses references to the performance of the parties in office, party organizations, and programs, and orientations toward intraparty groups, most of the material coded here focused on the honesty, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of leaders, their sense of fair play in dealing with other parties, and their political ethics. Indeed, almost one in seven references (13.5 percent) fits this kind of description. Another 6 percent involve charges over campaign materials. It was over who was and was not telling the truth that the participants came to the hardest verbal blows during the debates. At these moments, the participants displayed the most intense antagonism toward one another.
Were these attacks directed more toward one candidate or coalition than another? In Table 5 we have reported the percentage difference scores for the two coalitions and the four candidates in each of the five content categories. Although the governing coalition shows a positive balance in domestic and foreign policy, the leader of that coalition, Chancellor Brandt, receives poor marks in both. Moreover, Brandt, along with Strauss, shows a highly negative balance in the government and party management category. Hence, although none of the four party leaders emerged unscathed from the verbal battle, the honesty and integrity of Strauss, and especially Brandt, seemed to be most severely challenged in the debates. This does not mean, however, that the debates were costly to Chancellor Brandt. By attacking Brandt, Barzel and Strauss ran the risk of being tagged as negative themselves. This is clearly something we will want to consider as we turn now to viewer reactions to the debates.
Viewer Assessment of Debates and Attitudes Toward Issues and Participants
The debates of 1972 were a big rating success for the West German television networks. More than eight of every ten respondents (84 percent) in our survey reported watching at least one of the three debates, with nearly half of them tuning in to all three. Viewers, by a wide margin, were impressed with the debates; about 75 percent said they liked them "much" or "very much." The final game to decide the cup in European soccer competition hardly draws a larger and more enthusiastic audience. Political debates share several features with such a sports event. They present a contest from which one of the contestants, or a pair of them, emerges victories-Moreover, in the case of a political debate, the audience is called upon to declare the winner-in polls or, later, in the election.
By an overwhelming majority (65 percent) the public judged the Brandt-Scheel team to have fared best in the three debates. By about the same margin, the opposite team of Barzel and Strauss was judged to have fared worst. Lacking more detailed information on how viewers evaluated the debaters, we cannot establish which features of the debates noted in the previous sections of this paper most affected the viewers' judgments. What we can establish more firmly is whether the exposure to the debates altered the public's evaluation of the party leaders as well as of the political issues raised during the debates.
To determine this, we examined our panel respondents' judgments about Brandt and Barzel, as well as their estimates of the importance of various issues in the period between the beginning and the end of the 1972 campaign. Our expectations were that if the debates had generated support for a particular candidate or interest in a particular issue, we would be able to detect this by comparing the candidate perceptions and issue saliences of individuals watching varying numbers of debates. In no instance, however, is there solid evidence that the debates had a direct effect on either viewers' perceptions of the candidates or the salience of campaign issues. For example, while 35 percent of the respondents who watched all three debates felt more positive about Brandt at the end of the campaign than at the beginning, 42 percent of the respondents who watched none of the debates felt this way. A similar pattern is apparent for the issues that were prominent during the campaign. For instance, the proportion of the respondents who thought protection from terrorist attacks was more important at the end of the campaign than at the beginning is almost the same among those who watched all three debates as it is among those who watched none of them. This pattern holds for the other two issues (law and order and stable prices) for which we have continuous data. Moreover, it makes no difference whether we focus on respondents who thought the issues became more salient or on those who thought they became less salient. In no case is the relationship between the number of debates watched and issue salience statistically significant.
Yet, when we examine the effects of the debates on what might be regarded as the most important question in an election campaign, namely the competence of the parties or party coalitions to deal with specific issues of policy, a somewhat different picture emerges. In the 1972 survey, questions about party competence were asked in the first and second waves of the panel, and during this period the first of the three debates was held. The primary focus of this debate was West Germany's policy toward Eastern Europe {Ostpolitik).
The data indicate that individuals who watched the debate were far less likely to shift toward the side of the SPD-FDP coalition in their competence judgments than were those who did not watch it. In fact, while the SPD-FDP gain was less than 14 percent among watchers, it was 33 percent among nonwatchers.
3 In other words, far more nonwatchers than watchers thought after the debate that the governing coalition was more competent to deal with German relations with Eastern Europe. This relationship holds even when we control for political interest. Highly interested nonwatchers were more likely than highly interested watchers to feel the SPD-FDP coalition was best fit to deal with this issue. Hence, we cannot argue that the difference between watchers and nonwatchers is simply a manifestation of the fact that watchers are generally more interested in politics and thus more likely to be well informed about the approaches of the respective coalitions to Eastern Europe.
On the contrary, since the perceived competency of the opposition to deal with this issue definitely increased among watchers, the data tend to indicate that some knowledge gain occurred as a consequence of watching the first debate. Apparently, those who listened to and watched Brandt, Barzel, Scheel, and Strauss in 1972 learned that the difference in the parties' approaches to Eastern Europe was not as substantial as they may previously have thought and concluded that the ability of the SPD-FDP coalition to deal with this issue was only slightly greater than that of the CDU/CSU. In contrast, those who did not have this exposure seemed to feel the competency of the SPD-FDP coalition was substantially greater.
In these data, then, there is some evidence that the first debate had a direct effect on the quality of the information the population had about the coalitions' positions on the issue of West German relations with Eastern Europe. This finding is in accord with what American researchers have found for the 1976 debate between Carter and Ford. In their comprehensive review of the 1976 debate studies, for example, Sears and Chaffee note that "during the campaign, and especially around the time of the first debate, there was a significant jump in familiarity with the candidates' positions that seems closely connected with the content of the debate." (Sears and Chaffee, 1980:254) . Similarly, Miller and MacKuen suggest that "those individuals who watched the debates exhibited a heightened political awareness at exactly the time when political information is crucial-shortly before an election" (Miller and MacKuen, 1979:344 ).
Yet, in American research, there is only limited evidence that debates have other kinds of effects on electoral outcomes. For example, Sears and Chaffee point out that "there was little lasting impact of the debates on evaluations of the candidates, preferences between them, or perceptions of the candidates' attributes" (Sears and Chaffee, 1980:244) . This is very similar to our findings about the impact of the 1972 German debates on voters' perceptions of the candidates. In addition, Sears and Chaffee report that many voters had difficulty recalling what was discussed in the debates when asked after the election and tended to simplify the debate content they could recall, presumably to accord with prior attitudes and perceptions.
Nevertheless, American researchers emphasize that debates are important in crystallizing and reinforcing prior attitudes, positions, and intentions (Sears and Chaffee, 1979; Chaffee, 1980) . We believe the debates in Germany played a similar role in the 1972 election. Like other researchers, we believe debates must be viewed as one of many campaign events. In combination with these other influences, they may affect the outcome of elections and other political attitudes.
Elsewhere we have noted the potentially important reinforcing role of the media in the growth of party identification in postwar Germany (Norpoth and Baker, 1980) . We suspect a similar role can be ascribed to debates in German election campaigns. Just as the media, through their exposure of politicians and parties, may have contributed to a strengthening of partisanship in the postwar period, so, too, may election debates have contributed to reinforcement and crystallization of prior attitudes, and impressions gained through other election activities.
Conclusions
The electoral debates held on German television in 1972 featured a lively, if somewhat bruising, clash between the two candidates for the chancellor's office and their respective running mates. The debate participants wasted little time with ideological pronouncements or appeals to their group clientele in the audience. Instead, they devoted most of their attention to specific issues of domestic and foreign policy. The policy toward East Germany and Eastern Europe [Ostpolitik), inflation, and terrorism claimed the lion's share of debate attention. Beyond those concerns, the debates focused on the moral qualities of the participants, their honesty, truthfulness, fairness toward the political opponent as well as their campaign styles. In sum, issues and ethics dominated the debate agenda.
From the outset, the four debate participants were preoccupied with the incumbent government (SPD-FDP coalition), its handling of the three issues noted above, and the qualities of its leaders. The two leaders of the opposition (CDU/CSU) participating in the debates largely pursued a negative strategy aimed at destroying the government's credibility. Seldom did they direct attention to their own proposals for handling those issues. References to their own party frequently stressed the record of the CDU/CSU as governing party until 1969, but said little about future policy directions.
In what ways did the debates serve the electoral process in the Federal Republic in 1972? First, since they were so well attended and received, it seems likely that the public regarded them as important campaign events that would help them make or justify their electoral decisions. Second, there is evidence that the first debate had some effect on popular perceptions of the competence of the two coalitions to deal with one of the major campaign issues, West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe. Although our data did not permit us to determine whether these effects were enduring or fleeting, Miller and MacKuen (1979) suggest that information gains of this variety are often still evident some time after an election. Third, we feel the debates had some potentially important indirect effects on perceptions of the candidates and issue salience. The images of the candidates as well as the importance of certain issues did change during the course of the campaign, and we suspect that the debates, in conjunction with other campaign events and factors, contributed to these changes. In Chaffee's (1980) terms, the debates may have served as "catalysts" which improved the informational base for issue and candidate perceptions and thus strengthened the bond between these two factors and vote. Moreover, these effects may have occurred in the interpersonal interaction that followed the debates rather than at the actual time the televised confrontations took place.
However, to properly evaluate the effects of debates in Germany as well as to compare debates in Germany with those held in the United States and elsewhere, we need more precise information. Not only will we need questions which will enable us to evaluate the cognitive effects of televised confrontations between candidates, we must also have precise questions that will enable us to evaluate the effects of the debates on, for example, aspects of a candidate's image that could have been affected by what viewers observed during the contests. In short, the broad image and issue questions we have used in this analysis probably are not adequate for a rigorous test of debate effects. In addition, when there is more than one debate, as in 1972, we need to know which debate a viewer watched. In this way, we can match the content of a debate to a viewer's knowledge and attitudes about the issues discussed in a debate more directly. This strategy has been successfully pursued by Miller et al. (1979) in recent analyses of the impact of newspaper content on political efficacy and political cynicism.
